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who wishes to retain elements of control
over the disposition of her gift. However,
failure to closely follow statutory regula-
tions can make the trust income attributable
to the donor rather than the donee.
MERTENS, The Law of Federal Income Taxation
(Malone ed. (974)
2 Id.
3 The Courts considering the question of the
status of no-interest loans have essentially
limited their discussion to the tax effect
upon the borrower. Thus, this article will
only discuss the taxability of the borrower.
For an analysis of the potential tax conse-
quences to the lender, See Generally, R.I.
Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-
Free Loans from Corporations to Share-
holders and from Employers to Employees,
19 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 231 (1978).
4 This analysis of the Court is flawed for sev-
eral additional reasons. First, for those de-
ductions based upon gross income, there
would be miscalculations. Second, where a
corporation does not have sufficient earn-
ings and profits to give rise to a taxable divi-
dend, although a nontaxable return of capi-
tal would be given to a shareholder, the
shareholder should be entitled to an offset-
ting interest deduction. Third, interest is not
always deductible by a shareholder if he does
not itemize his deductions. In addition, under
section 163(d) of the Code, there are certain
limitations on interest deductions. See gener-
ally: R.I. Keller, The Tax Consequences of
Interest-Free Loans from Corporations to
Shareholders and from Employers to
Employees, supra at 235-340.
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Don't Be The Mortar Between The Bricks
by Clinton R. Black IV
While the practicing business law-
yer faces a variety of possible issues
and problems when dealing with
clients, one area which calls for par-
ticularly close scrutiny is securities
regulation. Several types of business
problems raise obvious securities im-
plications. It should be noted, how-
ever, that unconventional investment
vehicles which do not appear to have
securities implications can be a trap
for the unwary and lead to liability for
both client and lawyer if not recog-
nized early and addressed properly.
These unconventional investment ve-
hicles usually fall within the defini-
tion of "security" under the concept
of investment contract.
Once defined as a security, the plan
must either be registered with federal
and state agencies or find an exemp-
tion from registration under federal
and state laws and regulations. A
graphic example of an unconventional
investment opportunity which falls
within the definition of an invest-
ment contract, and is therefore a
security, is the pyramid scheme or
chain letter concept.
The evolution of the investment
contract theory as applied to uncon-
ventional investments has been stated
no more eloquently than in those
recent cases dealing specifically with
pyramid promotional schemes.
A pyramid scheme operating in
Maryland during the summer of 1980,
the so-called $16,000 pyramid, em-
ployed the classic pyramid structure.
In the basic $16,000 scheme, a chart is
drawn consisting, generally, of five
levels of boxes. A single large box is
on top, two slightly smaller boxes are
on the next level, four boxes are
below that, eight boxes fall on the
following plane, and sixteen boxes lie
across the bottom. There is one addi-
tional spot, called the zero position,
which rests above the top box.
Players "buy in" to the chart with
$1,000. A new investor, entering the
pyramid at the bottom, gives $500 to
the person in the slot directly above
and another $500 to the lucky player
in the zero position. Players progress
to the zero position and the $16,000
prize as the bottom level fills up.
In order to recoup more than one's
initial $1,000 investment many new
players must be brought in. They fill a
sixth level of 32 slots. Once these are
filled, the pyramid splits into four
new charts, each starting out with
one-fourth the needed investors.
When these big splits occur, inves-
tors move up rapidly in the new
pyramids. Once in the zero position,
only 32 new prospects are needed to
earn a player his $16,000 reward.
Totaling it all up, at least 128 new
players are needed to give each start-
ing player the $16,000 jackpot.
Further, the simple mathematical
factors inherent in the scheme show
the fallacy upon which the $16,000
pyramid is based. In a six level pyramid
such as the $16,000 scheme, 128 new
people must join after any given per-
son for that person to reach the top
and collect the profit. For each of
those 128 new people to profit, 16,384
new persons are needed. For each of
those 16,384 people to profit over
2,097,000 new people are needed.
This is equal to approximately one-
half the population of Maryland.
Thus, using the classic illustration,
if a number of people put the same
amount of money into a box, each
time any person withdraws more
from the box than he put in, some
other person will lose the same amount
the other person gained. See: O'Toole
vs. State, Case No. CJ-80-1984 (Okla.
Co. Dist. Ct. 1980).
Based upon federal and state case
law, as well as releases stating the
official position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Maryland
authorities concluded that the $16,000
pyramid constituted an investment
contract. Therefore it was a security
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which was required to be registered
with the Maryland Division of Secur-
ities pursuant to the provisions of the
Maryland Securities Act ("The Act").
The legal analysis underlying the state's
determination that the pyramid scheme
constituted an investment and, hence,
a security is the subject of this article.
Included in the definition of security
set forth in the Act is the term
investment contract. Md. Corp. &
Ass'ns. Code Ann. art. II 101 (o) (xi)
(1975).
The definition of a security set
forth in The Act is virtually identical
to the definition of security set forth
in the Securities Act of 1933, Section
2(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 77(b)(1) (1970).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
sets forth a similar definition in Sec-
tion 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)
(10) (1970).
The Maryland definition of secur-
ity is also identical to the definition set
forth in the Uniform Securities Act,
Section 401 (1) (1956) ("USA") which
was adopted by the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly in 1962. Although the
Act was recodified in 1975 as part of
the Corporation and Associations Article
of the Annotated Code of Maryland,
the statutory definition of security
has remained unchanged since 1962
and is, therefore, still consistent with
the USA.
Although the offer and sale of
securities have been subject to statu-
tory regulation in Maryland since the
adoption of the Maryland Blue Sky
Law in 1920, the definition of the
term "security" in use prior to the
adoption of the USA was limited to
"stocks, bonds, notes or other securi-
ties." Md. Blue Sky Law, Laws of
1920, Chap. 552, Section 11.
The definitions of security set forth
in the USA as adopted or substan-
tially adopted with modifications in
thirty-seven states, like the defini-
tions set forth in the two federal acts
mentioned above, traditionally have
been construed to include both con-
ventional and unconventional invest-
ment vehicles.
In addition, the definitional elements
of "investment contract", "evidence
of indebtedness" and "profit-sharing
agreement" have also received flex-
ible application by regulatory agencies
and the courts to a variety of "uncon-
ventional" or "exotic" investments.
For example, under certain circum-
stances, orange groves, real estate
lots, condominiums, gold and silver
bullion, diamonds, beavers, chinchil-
las, minks and worm farms have been
held to be securities in the form of
investment contracts.
As early as 1920, courts began to
develop the elements necessary to
create an investment contract. In State
v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn.
52,56, 177 N.W. 937,938 (Minn. Sup.
Ct. 1920), the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that "the placing of capi-
tal or laying out of money in a way
intended to secure income or profit
from its employment is an 'invest-
ment' as the word is commonly used
and understood." In 1947, the United
States Supreme Court clarified and
refined the concept of investment
contract, initially developed in Gopher
Tire, by holding that the test for
determining whether or not an offer-
ing constitutes an investment con-
tract is "whether the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." S.E.C. v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301
(1947). Accordingly, there are four
parts to this test: (1) the investment
of money; (2) in a common enterprise;
(3) with the expectation of a profit;
and (4) with that profit to be realized
through the efforts of someone other
than the investor.
(1) The Investment of
Money Element
The first requirement, that there
be an investment of money, means
that the investor must contribute
some consideration for his right to
take part in the scheme. Long, State
Securities Regulation, An Overview, 32
Okla. L. Rev. 541, 560 (1979). Invest-
ment contracts have been found even
where the required consideration did
not take the form of a cash payment.
Murphy v. Dare to be Great, Inc., [1971-
1978 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 71,053 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1972) (attendance at sales promotion
school part of investor's contribution
for the right to participate in the
plan). Moreover, the fact that the
investor receives a product in return
for his initial payment does not pre-
vent the finding of an investment
contract. State v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. Sup. Ct.
1971). Since participation in the typi-
cal $16,000 pyramid promotion re-
quired a cash contribution of $1,000,
the investment of money element of
the Howey test was satisfied in the
pyramid cases.
(2) The Common Enterprise
Element
The common enterprise element of
the Howey test is generally accepted to
mean that the promoter or some
third person take affirmative action
to bring about the expected investor
profit. Long, State Securities Regulation,
An Overview, supra at 564. To meet the
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separate legal entity nor must the
investor receive an ownership inter-
est. State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,
supra. Recently, the common enter-
prise element of the Howey test has
been held to mean only that the
investor's financial interests must be
inextricably interwoven with those of
the promoter or third parties. S.E. C. v.
Commodity Options International, Inc., 553
F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1977); S.E.C. v.
Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d
476, 482 n. 7 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); Hentzner v. Alaska, 3
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,558 (New
Matters) (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1980).
The literature used by promoters
to sell the $16,000 pyramid concept to
potential investors confirmed the exist-
ence of a common enterprise. The
first paragraph of the "Monitor's Out-
line", which promoters were required
to read to potential investors at pyra-
mid meetings states: "[w]e are all here
in this together with a common desire
to invest our money and to make
money." This language leaves no doubt
that more than one investor was
sought to join the enterprise and to
contribute some consideration toward
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(3) The Expectation of
Profit Element
In United Housing Foundation v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975) the Court decided
that profit would have to be a tangible
economic benefit such as money. All
that is required under this element of
the Howey test is that the investment
be induced by the expectation of
profit. It is immaterial that the profit
never materializes. State v. Hawaii Market
Center, Inc., 485 P. 2d 105 (Haw. Sup.
Ct. 1971); Long, State Securities Regula-
tion, An Overview, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 541,
567 (1979). Although the inherent
mathematical factors involved in pyra-
mid schemes dictate that the majority
of investors never receive profits,
these schemes are nevertheless in-
vestment contracts because the in-
vestor is induced to join by the prom-
ise of profits. Long, State Securities
Regulation, An Overivew, Id. at 567.
Simply stated, individual investors
were induced by the expectation that
an investment of $1,000 would propel
them to the $16,000 jackpot at the top
of the pyramid.
The language contained in the
monitor's outline under the section
headed "Motivation" presented po-
tential investors with a shopping list
of new cars, sailboats, furniture,
jewelry, investments and long de-
served vacations as affordable items
with the new wealth flowing from
the top of the pyramid. The promo-
ters also represented that, "short of
crime, this is the only painless way to
realize such gains." Investors were
thereby induced by the expectation of
profit. Hence, this element of the
Howey test is also satisfied.
(4) The Efforts of Others Element
If an investor does not share in the
critical management decisions that
are expected to lead to the promised
profit it is unimportant that the in-
vestor is required to perform physical
efforts for the enterprise. S.E.C. v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); State v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 485 P. 2d 105 (Haw. Sup. Ct.
1971).
In early applications of the Howey
test, several courts focused on the
"solely from the efforts of others"
language used by the Supreme Court.
This led these courts to hold that an
investment contract did not exist even
if the investor contributed only min-
imal, nonessential efforts to the enter-
prise. These early cases looked to the
physical labor performed for the enter-
prise rather than managerial efforts.
Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc.,
282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841 (Ala. Sup.
Ct. 1968); Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v.
Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E. 2d 620
(Ga. Sup. Ct. 1969). However, no
court since 1970 has taken this posi-
tion. Long, State Securities Regulation, An
Overview, supra at 569 n.131. In order
for an offering to avoid being desig-
nated as an investment contract within
the meaning of state and federal
securities law, the investor must share
in the critical management decisions
that are expected to lead to the prom-
ised profit. The evolution of this con-
cept is a result of efforts by the courts
to follow the Supreme Court's direc-
tions in Howey, supra, that "the statu-
tory policy of affording broad protec-
tion to investors is not to be thwarted
by unrealistic and irrelevant formu-
lae," Id. at 301, and Tcherepin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) that, due to
the remedial nature of both state and
federal statutes, securities legislation
"should be construed broadly to effect-
uate its purpose" and "form should be
disregarded for substance and the
emphasis should be on economic
reality."
A strict application of the "solely"
part of the Howey test to the pyramid
scheme would preclude characteriz-
ing the scheme as an investment con-
tract. The courts, however, consist-
ently have held that even where the
success of the enterprise contemplates
some physical efforts by the other-
wise passive investor, such efforts do
not negate characterization as an in-
vestment contract. Other than the
initial investment required by promo-
ters of the pyramid plan to "get on the
chart", the only effort an investor had
to make was to bring in two new
investors. Moreoever, any particular
investor who failed to bring in two
other investors could still reach the
top of the chart and collect the $16,000
profit. In other words, if one investor
brought in four other investors another
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common enterprise element of the
Howey test there does not have to be a
investor would not have to make any
effort to bring in new investors in
order to collect profits.
The $16,000 pyramid plan, as pro-
moted, meets the fourth element of
the Howey test.
Interestingly, the recent develop-
ment of the solely/substantially ele-
ment of the Howey test evolved through
a series of cases involving pyramid
schemes promoted in the early 1970's
by Glenn Turner. In separate actions
brought by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("S.E.C.") against
two Glenn Turner pyramid opera-
tions, "Dare to be Great, Inc." and
"Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.", invest-
ment contracts were found under the
Howey test despite investor parti-
cipation. S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
S.E.C. v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973). Moreover, Glenn
Turner was criminally prosecuted for
violation of federal securities laws as
a result of his promotion of and par-
ticipation in pyramid schemes. United
States v. Glenn W. Turner, Docket No.
75-167-Cr. T-H (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16,
1975).
Although the United States Su-
preme Court declined to review the
decision by the Ninth Circuit in the
Glenn Turner litigation, the Court
has since approved of the investment
contract analysis of the various state
courts and U.S. Courts of Appeal. In
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court held
that shares of stock which entitled
purchasers to lease an apartment in a
state subsidized nonprofit housing
cooperative did not constitute an
investment contract under federal
securities laws. However, in so hold-
ing, Justice Powell in his opinion for
the majority stated:
The touchstone [of the Howey
test] is the presence of an
investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of other... In
such cases the investor is
'attracted solely by the prospects
of a return' on his investment.
Id. at 852 (citations omitted).
This view was reaffirmed recently by
the Court in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561,
99 S. Ct. 790, 797 (1979).
As these cases indicate, the recent
trend has been to find an investment
contract when investors are not in-
volved in the essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or
success of the enterprise, but rather
are attracted to the plan by the pros-
pects of a return on their investment.
Hence, the "solely" part of the Howey
test is now commonly accepted to
mean "substantially" through the
efforts of others.
State courts, using the Howey in-
vestment contract concept as modi-
fied by recent case law, have also
found pyramid schemes to constitute
a security. Sauer v. Hays, 539 P.2d 1343
(Colo. App. 1975) (sales scheme where-
by persons, for compensation, induced
others to become participants in the
plan for the purpose of recruiting
other participants, held to be an in-
vestment contract); Mahoney v. Andresen,
72 Misc. 2d 1054, 340 N.Y.S. 2d 553
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (pyramid selling
plan in the nature of a chain letter by
which profits were promised each
buyer who in turn persuaded others
to buy, held to be an investment con-
tract); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v.
Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693, aff'd, 232 So.
2d 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1970) (profit from
commissions paid upon obtaining other
participants, held to be profit sharing
agreement and, hence, a security). See
also: Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to Be
Regulated, 61 Geo. L. Rev. 1257 (1973);
Comment, Securities Regulation - Pyramid
Promotion of Self-Improvement Courses In-
volves Sale of Investment Contracts Within
Coverage of Federal Securities Laws, 51 Tex.
L. Rev. 788 (1972).
In the only Maryland opinion which
speaks to the subject, this realistic
view of the Howey test developed in
the pyramid scheme cases was referred
to approvingly by Judge Proctor of
the Baltimore County Circuit Court
in Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity
Trust Corp., [1971-1978 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1973). In his
opinion, Judge Proctor stated:
By use of the phrase common
enterprise and profit solely
through the efforts of someone
other than the investor, the
[Howey] Court.. .did not mean
to limit an investment contract to
just that and only that. Id.
at p. 67,336.
Judge Proctor decided First Federated on
narrow jurisdictional grounds. How-
ever, Judge Proctor went on to address
the investment contract issue raised
in the case. Specifically referring to
the 9th Circuit Glenn Turner decision,
Judge Proctor opined:
It was a scheme to defraud, and
the Court cut through all the fol-
de-rol and technical questions
raised by Turner, and said this is
within the Securities Act; this is a
scheme to defraud investors. Id.
at p. 67,335.
In 1972, the Maryland Securities
Commissioner also brought suit
against Glenn Turner and his "Dare
to Be Great" pyramid scheme. Shapiro
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., Cir-
cuit Court of Baltimore City Docket
No. 1972, File No.: A-52755, Folio:
A-468. The action filed by the Mary-
land Securities Commissioner sought
to enjoin Glenn Turner from selling
unregistered securities in his promo-
tion of the "Dare to Be Great" pyramid
scheme. Pursuant to the Consent
Decree entered by the Circuit Court
of Baltimore City, the defendants
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agreed to an injunction prohibiting
them from further violations of the
Maryland securities laws in connec-
tion with the offer and sale of pyramid
schemes or techniques.
The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has followed an administra-
tive policy consistent with the case
law on the subject of pyramid sales
plans as investment contracts. Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5211, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH 78,446 (Nov. 30, 1971). In
Release No. 52 11, entitled "Applicabil-
ity of the Securities Laws to Multi-
Level Distributorships and Pyramid
Sales Plans", the S.E.C. emphasized
that the assignment of nominal or
limited responsibilities to a partici-
pant does not negate the existence of
an investment contract, particularly
where the duties involved are nar-
rowly circumscribed and involve little
real choice. Moreover, where the duties
assigned have little direct effect upon
receipt by the participant of the bene-
fits promised by the promoters, a
security may be found to exist. Id. at p.
80,974. The fact that an investor is
urged to go out and find two more
persons so that he may at least recoup
his investment involves such little
real choice that this activity would
not, according to the S.E.C., negate
the existence of an investment con-
tract.
The administrative position of the
S.E.C. appears to remain unchanged
in that, in November of 1979, the
S.E.C. issued an opinion applying its
position as stated in Release No. 5211 to
a chain letter pyramid plan. In re John
M. Marcucci, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,434 (Aug. 13, 1979). This scheme
involved a chain letter in which each
recipient was to pay $37.50 for a copy
of the letter with a $25.00 Savings
Bond attached. In true pyramid style,
an individual investor sent a bond to
the person at the top of the list and
then attempted to sell to new inves-
tors after making two additional copies
of the instructions and list of-names
and attaching two more bonds. Pur-
chasers were told that they eventu-
ally would receive 2,048 savings bonds
worth $51,000 at maturity. Like the
$16,000 pyramid scheme, "in-person"
solicitations were used to promote
the scheme, thus avoiding possible
mail fraud charges. Although noting
the per se securities law implications
arising from the use of a savings
bond, the S.E.C. went on to add that
"the program itself would appear to
involve the offering of an investment
contract, which would also constitute
a security... subject to the registra-
tion requirements of the 1933 Act...."
Id. at p. 82,840.
Summary
Although pyramid schemes have
been held to be investment contracts
under both state and federal securi-
ties laws, it should be noted that
many other unconventional offerings
have been held to be investment con-
tracts and, hence, securities. Miller v.
Central Chinchilla Group, Inc. 494 F.2d
414 (8th Cir. 1974) (contracts for the
sale of chinchillas where investors
required to exert some effort, held to
be investment contracts); Continental
Marketing Corp. v. S.E.C., 387 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
905 (1968) (scheme to invest in pro-
duction of beavers, held to be -an
investment contract); Blackwell v. Bent-
sen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953)
(investment in orange groves where
minimal effort by investor contem-
plated by promoter, held to be an
investment contract); State v. Hawaii
Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw.
Sup. Ct. 1971) ("founder" program,
held to be an investment contract);
Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori,
226 So.2d 693, aff'd, 232 So.2d 17 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. 1970) ("founder" program,
where "founders" were to recruit
other founders, held to be a profit
sharing agreement and, hence, a secur-
ity); State v. Bull Investment Group, Inc.
351 A.2d 879 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974)
(sale and promotion of dealerships
where role of investor was limited to
recruiting of other investors, held to
be an investment contract); In re Long's
Long Life Wormery, Inc., 3 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) §71,441 (New Matters)
(Iowa Comm. of Ins. March 22, 1978)
(earthworm marketing contracts
where investors required to exert
some effort, held to be investment
contracts).
The modification of the Howey test
by federal and state courts evolved as
a response to fraudulent activity in
the field of exotic investments, such
as pyramid schemes. The courts real-
ized that strict adherence to the
"solely" element of the Howey test
enabled unscrupulous promoters to
steer clear of securities regulation.
Solace was found in the basic princi-
ple underlying Definitional Determi-
nations under the securities laws. It is
the economic realities of the offering
that lie at the heart of these determi-
nations. The saga, however, is yet to
be finished. In Piambino v. Bailey, 610
F.2d 1306 (1980), the Fifth Circuit, in
dictum, questioned its decision in Kos-
cot. It may be a harbinger of things to
come. Stay tuned.
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